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Comparing  Wayfair and Wynne:
Lessons for the Future of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause 
Edward A. Zelinsky
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article compares the Supreme Court’s dormant 
Commerce Clause decisions in South Dakota v. Wayfair1 and 
Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne.2 Wayfair and 
Wynne are both as important, as they were narrowly-decided. 
Despite (perhaps because of) their differences, they together tell 
us much about the current Court’s divisions under the dormant 
Commerce Clause and about the future of the dormant 
Commerce Clause.  
A comparison of Wayfair and Wynne indicates that the prospect 
of the Court jettisoning the dormant Commerce Clause altogether is 
unlikely. However, the Justices who would abandon the dormant 
Commerce Clause can exercise decisive influence in particular cases 
as they did in Wayfair.3 The current Court’s dormant Commerce 
Clause skeptics—Justices Thomas and Gorsuch—provided the 
crucial fourth and fifth votes in Wayfair to overturn Quill.4
It will continue to be rare for the Court to reverse its own 
dormant Commerce Clause decisions. Far from opening the 
floodgates, Wayfair indicates that the Court is reluctant to overrule 
its dormant Commerce Clause cases in light of Congress’s ultimate 
constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce. However, 
when neither the Court nor Congress has spoken on a particular 
issue, the Court will consider extending the dormant Commerce 
Clause as it did in Wynne.5
Going forward, an important issue under the dormant 
Commerce Clause will be the double taxation which results when 
 Morris and Annie Trachman Professor of Law at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School 
of Law of Yeshiva University. For helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article, I 
thank Professors Brannon P. Denning, Daniel Hemel, and Mitchell Engler. 
1 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). 
2 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015). 
3 See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2087.  
4 Id.
5 See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1794. 
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an individual is deemed to be a resident for tax purposes, by two 
states, each of which taxes all of the dual resident’s income. Wayfair
and Wynne suggest that, despite the compelling arguments against 
the double state taxation of dual residents’ incomes, the Court will 
be reluctant to set aside its precedents upholding the double state 
taxation of dual residents.6
Instead, the Court is more likely to extend dormant 
Commerce Clause protection when states are overly aggressive in 
taxing the income of nonresidents. In particular, the Court is more 
likely to apply the dormant Commerce Clause apportionment 
principle to curb New York’s “convenience of the employer” 
doctrine to avoid New York’s double state income taxation of 
telecommuters on the days they work at their out-of-state homes.7
II. WAYFAIR
By a 5-4 vote, Wayfair overturned Quill Corp. v. North 
Dakota8 as “unsound and incorrect.”9 In 1992, Quill confirmed 
the dormant Commerce Clause rule that a state could impose 
sales tax collection responsibilities on a retailer only if the 
retailer had a physical presence in the taxing state.10 This 
physical presence rule had first been announced in National 
Bellas Hess v. Department of Revenue in 1967.11 Quill and Bellas 
Hess were decided before the rise of the Internet and electronic 
commerce. These decisions severely limited the states’ abilities to 
enforce their respective sales taxes on internet purchases by 
precluding the states from imposing sales tax collection duties on 
out-of-state internet and mail-order retailers.12
In Wayfair, Justice Kennedy advanced three basic themes for 
overturning Quill and thereby abolishing the physical presence 
rule.13 The first of these Wayfair themes was the historic legitimacy 
of the dormant Commerce Clause which “imposes limitations on the 
States absent congressional action.”14 A second theme of Wayfair
was the flaws of Quill and of the physical presence rule15 which 
6 See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2080; Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1787. 
7 See generally Edward A. Zelinsky, New York’s “Convenience of the Employer” Rule 
is Unconstitutional, 48 ST. TAX NOTES 553 (2008). 
8 504 U.S. 298 (1992), overruled by South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). 
9 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099. 
10 See id. at 314. 
11 86 U.S. 753 (1967), confirmed by Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), 
and overruled by South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). 
12 For further background on these limitations, see Edward A. Zelinsky, The Political 
Process Argument for Overruling Quill, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1177, 1180–84 (2017) and Andrew 
J. Haile, Affiliate Nexus in E-Commerce, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 1803, 1806–12 (2012). 
13 See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2088–97. 
14 Id. at 2089. 
15 Id. at 2088. 
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Quill perpetuated under the dormant Commerce Clause. That rule, 
Justice Kennedy wrote, “is not a necessary interpretation” of the 
substantial nexus test developed under the dormant Commerce 
Clause.16 Moreover, that rule “creates rather than resolves market 
distortions”17 and embodies an “arbitrary, formalistic distinction”18
between those types of in-state presence which are deemed to create 
substantial nexus with the state and those which are not. “In the 
name of federalism and free markets, Quill does harm to both.”19
Third, Justice Kennedy concluded the Court should disregard the 
dictates of stare decisis and should itself overturn Quill rather than 
rely on Congress to overrule the “unfair and unjust”20 physical 
presence rule.21
Concurring with Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, Justice 
Thomas reiterated his view that the Court’s dormant Commerce 
Clause case law “can no longer be rationally justified.”22 Also 
concurring, Justice Gorsuch did not go as far as Justice Thomas but, 
in a skeptical vein, noted that the validity of the Court’s dormant 
Commerce Clause case law is a “question[ ] for another day.”23
Thus, while Justices Thomas and Gorsuch provided the fourth 
and fifth votes in Wayfair, they bottomed their conclusions on 
different premises than those embraced by Justice Kennedy. For 
Justice Kennedy (joined by Justices Alito and Ginsburg) the 
dormant Commerce Clause is a legitimate enterprise which went 
astray in Quill.24 For Justice Thomas (definitely) and for Justice 
Gorsuch (probably), Quill was not simply a mistake, but rather 
was the product of the misbegotten project that is the dormant 
Commerce Clause.25
As a matter of substance, Chief Justice Roberts was as critical 
of the physical presence rule as was Justice Kennedy. On behalf of 
himself and three of his colleagues, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that 
Bellas Hess, which originally announced the physical presence rule 
confirmed in Quill, “was wrongly decided.”26 Consequently, not 
a single member of the Wayfair Court concluded that the physical 
16 Id. at 2092. 
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 2096. 
20 Id.
21 Id. at 2096–97. 
22 Id. at 2100 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 
U.S. 298, 333 (1992)). 
23 Id. at 2100–01 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
24 Id. at 2087, 2097. 
25 See id. at 2100 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2100–01 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).  
26 Id. at 2101 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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presence rule was appropriate for an economy in which electronic 
commerce is now so prominent. 
However, the Chief Justice and his three colleagues joining 
his Wayfair dissent concluded that Congress, not the Court, was 
the appropriate forum for overturning Quill’s rule that a state 
can impose sales tax collection responsibilities only on a retailer 
with in-state physical presence.27 The revision of this rule, the 
Chief Justice argued, “should be undertaken by Congress.”28
Congress, he observed, “has in fact been considering 
whether to alter the rule established in Bellas Hess for some 
time.”29 “[L]egislators may more directly consider the competing 
interests at stake.”30
In sum, Quill reflected three different perspectives among the 
Justices of the Court. Four Justices (Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan) did not dispute the 
fundamental legitimacy of the dormant Commerce Clause or the 
unsoundness of the physical presence rule for imposing upon 
retailers the obligation to collect state sales taxes.31 However, as a 
procedural matter, these four dissenting Justices preferred for 
Congress, rather than the Court, to make any changes to the 
physical presence rule announced in Bellas Hess and confirmed in 
Quill.32 Three members of the Court (Justices Kennedy, Alito, and 
Ginsburg) defended the intrinsic validity of the dormant Commerce 
Clause, but concluded that Quill and its physical presence rule were 
properly overturned by the Court itself.33 Two Justices (Justices 
Thomas and Gorsuch) expressed their skepticism about the 
dormant Commerce Clause and caused Quill to be overruled by 
joining with their three colleagues who, while more positive about 
the dormant Commerce Clause, supported Quill’s demise.34 Hence, 
Wayfair, by a 5-4 vote, quashed Quill.
III. WYNNE
Similar divisions were evident three years earlier in Wynne,
another 5-4 dormant Commerce Clause decision.35 Wayfair expanded 
state authority by abolishing the physical presence rule, thereby 
permitting states to impose sales tax collection responsibilities on 
27 Id. at 2102 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
28 Id. at 2101 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
29 Id. at 2102 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
30 Id. at 2104 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
31 See id. at 2101–05 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
32 See id. at 2102–04 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
33 Id. at 2089–90, 2099. 
34 See id. at 2100 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2100 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
35 Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1791 (2015). 
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out-of-state internet and mail-order retailers that lack in-state 
physical presence.36 In contrast, Wynne curbed state taxing authority 
by requiring states to grant income tax credits to their residents for 
the out-of-state income taxes such residents pay.37
The tax at issue in Wynne was the county income tax imposed 
by Maryland law.38 While the Maryland state income tax gave 
Maryland residents credits for the income taxes such residents 
paid to other states, Maryland did not extend a similar credit 
under the Maryland county income tax for out-of-state taxes paid 
by Maryland residents.39 For a five Justice majority, Justice Alito 
held that this failure to grant residents a county income tax credit 
for out-of-state taxes discriminated against interstate commerce in 
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause.40
The four central themes of Justice Alito’s opinion were the 
historic provenance of the dormant Commerce Clause, the analogy 
between a tariff and Maryland’s failure to grant Maryland residents 
a credit under the Maryland county income tax for out-of-state 
taxes, the evils of double state taxation, and the “internal 
consistency” test developed under the dormant Commerce Clause.41
Presaging his agreement with Justice Kennedy in Wayfair, Justice 
Alito in Wynne embraced the legitimacy of the dormant Commerce 
Clause, which “has deep roots.”42 “[A] state tariff,” Justice Alito 
36 See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099. 
37 See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1792. As an alternative to providing its residents with 
income tax credits for out-of-state income taxes, a state can comply with Wynne’s 
nondiscrimination/internal consistency standard by eschewing the taxation of 
nonresidents’ incomes earned within the state. An income tax imposed only on residents 
passes the test of internal consistency since, if adopted universally, such a tax only taxes 
income once—assuming that taxpayers are residents in only one state. See id. at 1822 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). This possibility confirms the point made in the text: Wayfair
expands state tax authority by permitting a state to impose sales tax collection 
responsibilities on out-of-state internet sellers. In contrast, Wynne restricts state tax 
authority by requiring states to grant credits to their residents for the out-of-state taxes 
such residents pay or by abandoning the taxation of nonresidents on the income they earn 
in the state. 
38 Id. at 1792. For more background on Wynne, see generally Edward A. Zelinsky, 
The Enigma of Wynne, 7 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 797 (2016), which discusses the 
enigmatic effects of Wynne on future dormant Commerce Clause application, and Brannon 
P. Denning, The Dormant Commerce Clause Wynnes Won Wins One: Five Takes on Wynne 
and Direct Marketing Association, 100 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 103 (2016), which 
compares Wynne to prior case law to help define its scope of impact. 
39 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1792.  
40 Id.
41 See id. at 1794–95, 1802, 1804. 
42 Id. at 1794. Dissenting in Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 376 (2008), 
Justice Alito characterized his position in Davis and in United Haulers Ass’n., Inc. 
v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 356 (2007) as “proceed[ing] . . . on the 
assumption that the Court's established dormant Commerce Clause precedents should be 
followed . . . .” This statement could be interpreted as leaving the door open to a reassessment of 
the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause case law. However, Justice Alito’s Wynne opinion and 
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wrote, was “the quintessential evil targeted by the dormant 
Commerce Clause.”43 Maryland’s failure to grant residents a credit 
for out-of-state taxes “has the same economic effect” as a tariff.44
Maryland’s county income tax flouts the norms of the dormant 
Commerce Clause, Justice Alito wrote, because “Maryland’s tax 
scheme is inherently discriminatory and operates as a tariff.”45
To advance this characterization, Justice Alito contrasted two 
hypothetical residents of a state which provides no credit for 
out-of-state taxes.46 In this example, one of these residents earns 
all of her income in-state while the other resident earns his income 
out-of-state.47 Because the state in which they live provides no 
credit for out-of-state taxes, the latter resident pays two state 
income taxes on his income, one tax to the state of his residence 
and a second tax to the state in which he earns his income.48 On 
the other hand, the first resident pays a single state tax on her 
income since she earns all of her income in-state.49 Like a tariff, 
this encourages residents to generate income at home rather than 
out-of-state so as to be taxed only once by the state of residence, 
rather than twice by the state of residence and simultaneously by 
the second state in which the income is earned.50
According to Justice Alito, a state tax scheme which provides 
no credit for the out-of-state taxes paid by residents violated the 
dormant Commerce Clause’s internal consistency test.51 Under 
this test, the relevant inquiry is what would happen if all states 
adopted the tax being challenged under the dormant Commerce 
Clause.52 Justice Alito answered that in such a theoretical world 
there are effectively state tariffs nationwide so an individual who 
ventures to earn out-of-state income in this hypothetical setting 
is always double taxed by the two states in which she lives and 
works.53 In contrast, an individual who just earns income in her 
home state is taxed only once by her state of residence.54 This, 
Justice Alito observed, unconstitutionally discriminates against 
interstate economic activity. 
his support for Justice Kennedy’s Wayfair opinion evince a stronger commitment to the 
dormant Commerce Clause. 
43 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1792. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 1804. 
46 Id. at 1803–04. 
47 Id. at 1803. 
48 Id. at 1803–04. 
49 Id. at 1804. 
50 See id.
51 Id. at 1803. 
52 See id. at 1802. 
53 Id. at 1804. 
54 Id. at 1803–04. 
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For himself and Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia in Wynne
excoriated the dormant Commerce Clause as “a judge-invented 
rule”55 which contrasts with “the real Commerce Clause.”56 The 
Commerce Clause, Justice Scalia informed us, is an affirmative 
grant of power to Congress, not a license for judges “to set aside 
state laws they believe burden commerce.”57 Justice Scalia’s 
skepticism of the dormant Commerce Clause led him to conclude 
that, “[f]or reasons of stare decisis,”58 he would strike taxes under 
the dormant Commerce Clause in only two cases: a state tax 
which “discriminates on its face against interstate commerce or 
[a tax which] cannot be distinguished from a tax [the] Court has 
already held unconstitutional.”59 In contrast, Justice Thomas was 
(and is) unwilling to defer to existing dormant Commerce Clause 
case law in these two or in any other cases.60
Justice Ginsburg’s Wynne dissent, like Justice Alito’s majority 
opinion, accepts the legitimacy of the dormant Commerce Clause.61
However, Justice Ginsburg concluded (joined by Justices Scalia 
and Kagan) that Wynne misapplied the dormant Commerce 
Clause.62 Since the Wynnes are Maryland residents, Maryland can 
tax all of their worldwide income. The dormant Commerce Clause, 
Justice Ginsburg maintained, does not require Maryland as a 
state of residence to grant Marylanders like the Wynnes a credit 
for the out-of-state taxes they pay.63 Such credits for out-of-state 
taxes may be wise as a matter of policy. But, Justice Ginsburg 
argued, there are competing concerns which justify states taxing 
their residents’ incomes without granting credits for the 
out-of-state taxes such residents pay: “More is given to the 
residents of a [s]tate than to those who reside elsewhere, therefore 
more may be demanded of them.”64
Moreover, Maryland residents do not need dormant Commerce 
Clause protection from their own state’s tax laws since they 
vote for the legislators and governors who tax them. In contrast, 
nonresidents need dormant Commerce Clause succor as they do not 
vote in the state which taxes them on the income they earn in the 
taxing state.65 The majority in Wynne, Justice Ginsburg argued, 
55 Id. at 1807 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
56 Id. at 1808 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
57 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
58 Id. at 1811 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
59 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
60 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
61 See id. at 1815 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
62 See id. at 1814 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
63 See id. at 1816 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
64 Id. at 1814 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
65 See id. at 1814–15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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erroneously constitutionalized “tax policy” better left to “state 
legislatures and the Congress.”66
IV. THE FUTURE OF DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE SKEPTICISM
An important takeaway from comparing Wynne and Wayfair
is that the Justices who would abolish the dormant Commerce 
Clause are not close to constituting a majority of the Court. 
However, in particular cases, these dormant Commerce Clause 
skeptics can exercise critical influence on the Court’s decisions. 
In Wynne, it was Justices Scalia and Thomas who scorned 
the dormant Commerce Clause.67 In Wayfair, Justices Thomas 
and Gorsuch played the role of dormant Commerce Clause 
skeptics.68 In Wynne, Justices Scalia and Thomas had no impact 
on the outcome of the case since five Justices concluded without 
them that the dormant Commerce Clause requires Maryland to 
provide a credit under its county income tax to Maryland 
residents for the out-of-state taxes such residents pay.69 On the 
other hand, in Wayfair, Justices Thomas and Gorsuch proved 
critical to the Court’s outcome, giving Justice Kennedy the fourth 
and fifth votes he needed to overturn Quill.70
Two uncertainties complicate this situation for the future. 
First, we do not know whether Justice Kennedy’s successor, Justice 
Brett Kavanaugh, will share Justice Kennedy’s commitment to the 
dormant Commerce Clause or whether he will align himself with 
dormant Commerce Clause skepticism. Second, that skepticism, 
Wynne and Wayfair make clear, can come in different forms. 
Despite his doubts about the dormant Commerce Clause, Justice 
Scalia remained willing to strike taxes under that doctrine in either 
of two contexts: When, as a matter of stare decisis, a pending case 
was clearly controlled by a prior decision, or when discrimination 
against interstate commerce was apparent “on [the] face” of the 
challenged state tax.71 An interesting possibility is that, had 
Justice Scalia lived, he might, in the interests of stare decisis, 
have provided Chief Justice Roberts with the fifth Wayfair vote 
for retaining Quill.
66 See id. at 1823 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
67 See id. at 1808 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
68 See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2100 (2018) (Thomas, J., 
concurring); id. at 2100 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
69 See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1791. 
70 See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2087.  
71 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1811 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Thomas, by contrast, will in all cases refuse to apply the 
dormant Commerce Clause.72 Justice Gorsuch’s brief comments in 
his Wayfair concurrence73 leave open for him either of these 
approaches and perhaps others. 
In short, the dormant Commerce Clause enjoys broad support 
among the Justices currently serving on the Court. However, in 
particular instances, the Justices who are dormant Commerce Clause 
skeptics may play a pivotal role.74 Wayfair was such a case.75
V. DOES WAYFAIR OPEN THE FLOODGATES?
Whenever the Court overrules a prominent precedent, the 
question arises: What is next? Wayfair makes clear that, in the 
dormant Commerce Clause context, the answer is: Not much. 
Wayfair does not open the floodgates to revision of the Court’s 
dormant Commerce Clause case law. 
This conclusion starts with the four Justices who would have 
left Quill standing despite the admitted unsuitability of the 
physical presence rule in a world of electronic commerce.76 Since 
the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause decisions can be revised or 
rejected by Congress, Chief Justice Roberts and his dissenting 
colleagues contended, the Court should let the Legislative Branch 
make whatever changes are required to overturn or modify the 
Court’s dormant Commerce Clause case law.77
Moreover, Justice Kennedy made clear that he viewed the 
judicial overruling of Quill as uniquely compelling: “Though Quill
was wrong on its own terms when it was decided in 1992, since 
then the Internet revolution has made its earlier error all the 
more egregious and harmful.”78
This is not an invitation for the Court to engage in wholesale 
revision of its dormant Commerce Clause case law. To the 
contrary, if it requires something on the order of “the Internet 
revolution” to justify overruling a dormant Commerce Clause 
precedent, such overruling will be rare.  
Only Justice Thomas is committed to a thoroughgoing 
repudiation of the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause oeuvre.79
72 See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting); South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 
2100 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
73 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2100 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
74 See id. at 2087. 
75 See id.
76 See id. at 2101–05 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts was joined by 
Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. See id.
77 Id. at 2102 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
78 Id. at 2097. 
79 See id. at 2100 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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As just noted, Justice Gorsuch’s views are still unarticulated and 
Justice Kavanaugh, who replaced Justice Kennedy, may or may 
not be a dormant Commerce Clause skeptic. But even a dormant 
Commerce Clause skeptic can, like Justice Scalia, temper his 
opposition to the dormant Commerce Clause with a commitment 
to stare decisis.80
Consider in this context Justice Kagan’s positions in Wayfair
and Wynne. In Wayfair, Justice Kagan joined the Chief Justice in 
contending that it was better for Congress, rather than the 
Court, to overturn or modify the physical presence rule confirmed 
in Quill.81 In Wynne, Justice Kagan joined Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissent which argued, inter alia, that Mr. and Mrs. Wynne 
needed no relief from the Court.82 As Maryland voters, the 
Wynnes had recourse to Maryland’s political process to relieve 
them of their double taxation under the Maryland county income 
tax. Strong deference to political processes, as manifested by 
Justice Kagan’s positions in Wynne and Wayfair, counsels equally 
strong respect for precedent since such deference consigns the 
task of revising dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to the 
political institutions of government.83
VI. TWO ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE
A. The Double Taxation of Dual Residents 
What are the implications of Wynne and Wayfair for 
particular issues the Court is likely to confront in the future? An 
important dormant Commerce Clause issue going forward is the 
double taxation of dual state residents.84 In an earlier age, it was 
mainly very wealthy individuals whose peripatetic lifestyles 
caused two or more states to classify them as residents. When 
two (or more) states levying personal income taxes both assert 
that the same individual is a resident, this dual resident can be 
double taxed as both of these states claim the right to tax him on 
his worldwide income.85 The double taxation of dual residents is, 
in practice, particularly pronounced as to a dual resident’s 
80 See Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1811 (2015) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
81 See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2101–02 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
82 See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1816, 1823 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
83 See id. at 1823 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2101–02 (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting).  
84 See Edward A. Zelinsky, Double Taxing Dual Residents: A Response to Knoll and 
Mason, 86 ST. TAX NOTES 677, 677 (2017) [hereinafter Double Taxing]; Edward A. 
Zelinsky, Apportioning State Personal Income Taxes to Eliminate the Double Taxation of 
Dual Residents: Thoughts Provoked by the Proposed Minnesota Snowbird Tax, 15 FLA.
TAX REV. 533, 534 (2014) [hereinafter Apportioning]. 
85 See Zelinsky, Apportioning, supra note 84, at 536. 
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retirement income (taxed by both states claiming to be a state of 
residence)86 and as to a dual resident’s passive investment income, 
such as dividends and interests (similarly taxed by both states 
claiming to be this individual’s state of residence).87
In the contemporary world, the phenomenon of dual state 
residence has spread to two career families maintaining residences in 
different states to accommodate both careers.88 Dual state residence 
has also spread to “mass affluent” retirees who divide the year 
between different homes in different states. In these (and other) 
contexts, an individual spends part of the year living in two different 
states and thus can be income taxed as a resident by both of them. 
It would be best for Congress to eliminate by federal 
legislation the double state income taxation of dual state 
residents, or for the states themselves to abate the problem of 
double taxed dual residents. Absent a political solution enacted 
by Congress or negotiated among the states, the courts will find 
themselves implored to grant relief from dual residents’ double 
state income taxation under the dormant Commerce Clause.89
I favor a political solution to the problem of double taxed 
dual residents, either through federal legislation or through 
formal or informal arrangements among the states. If there is 
to be a judicial resolution of this issue, the dormant Commerce 
Clause principle of apportionment is the most compelling of the 
tools the courts can employ to eliminate the double taxation of 
dual residents.90 Others think that the dormant Commerce 
Clause concept of nondiscrimination, and Wynne in particular, 
are the appropriate doctrinal handles for convincing the courts to 
bar double taxation of dual residents.91
86 4 U.S.C. § 114(a) (2006) (“No State may impose an income tax on any retirement 
income of an individual who is not a resident or domiciliary of such State (as determined 
under the laws of such State).”). 
87 On the principle that intangible investment-based income is taxed by the 
taxpayer’s state(s) of residence and the double state taxation of such income when an 
individual is a resident for tax purposes of two states, see Zelinsky, Apportioning, supra
note 84, at 541, 548–49, which discusses the principle of mobilia sequuntur personam.
88 Sue Shellenbarger, Work & Family: Marriage From a Distance—More couples are 
living apart—here’s what it takes to keep the relationship healthy, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 
2018, at A11 (“[O]f married people living apart . . . . a sizable number do this for work.”). 
89 See, e.g., Edelman v. New York State Dep’t of Taxation & Fin., 80 N.Y.S.3d 241, 
243 (App. Div. 2018); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Noto decision and the double state income 
taxation of dual residents, OUPBLOG (June 2, 2014), https://blog.oup.com/2014/06/noto-
decision-double-state-income-taxation/ [http://perma.cc/TN5P-YEAJ]. 
90 Zelinsky, Double Taxing, supra note 84, at 678; Zelinsky, Apportioning, supra note 
84, at 570. 
91 See generally Michael S. Knoll & Ruth Mason, New York’s Unconstitutional Tax 
Residence Rule, 85 ST. TAX NOTES 707 (2017). 
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Wynne indeed reflects a strong aversion to double taxation. 
But, as we have just seen, Wynne and Wayfair also reflect 
commitments by members of the Court to stare decisis and to 
deference to the political process.92 Moreover, the Court has in 
the past condoned the double state taxation of dual residents.93
Wynne and Wayfair suggest that the Court will be reluctant to 
construe the dormant Commerce Clause to forbid the double 
state income taxation of dual residents since this would entail 
the Court’s repudiation of long-standing case law condoning such 
double taxation.94
Justice Kavanaugh, Justice Kennedy’s successor, could play 
a pivotal role in this area. If Justice Kavanaugh is a dormant 
Commerce Clause skeptic, it will require near unanimity by the 
other six Justices of the Court to apply the dormant Commerce 
Clause to bar the double taxation of dual residents. Even if 
Justice Kavanaugh adheres to the dormant Commerce Clause, 
with Justices Thomas and Gorsuch both leery of the dormant 
Commerce Clause, it will require a strong consensus among the 
other seven Justices to declare the double taxation of dual 
residents unconstitutional. Wynne and Wayfair, both decided 5-4, 
indicate that strong consensus is not easily achieved today in the 
dormant Commerce Clause context.95
A counterargument is that the Court’s decisions permitting the 
double taxation of dual residents—Cory v. White96 and Worcester 
County Trust Co. v. Riley97—were decided under the Due Process 
Clause. Moreover, these cases involved state-imposed death taxes, 
rather than state income taxes. The Court could now possibly hold 
that the double taxation of dual residents is forbidden by the 
dormant Commerce Clause even though, per these earlier cases, a 
double state taxation is permitted as a matter of due process. 
Justice Alito did something similar in Wynne when he and four 
other Justices held that although the Due Process Clause 
permits states to tax all of their residents’ worldwide incomes, 
the dormant Commerce Clause does not.98
92 See Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1811 (2015) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
93 Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 89 (1982); Worcester Cty. Tr. Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 
292, 298 (1937). 
94 See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1811 (Scalia, J., dissenting); South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 
138 S. Ct. 2080, 2101–02 (2018) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Worcester Cty. Tr. Co., 
302 U.S. at 299. 
95 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2087; Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1791. 
96 457 U.S. at 89. 
97 302 U.S. at 292. 
98 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1798–99. 
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Alternatively, the Court could conceivably cabin Cory and 
Worcester County Trust Co. to their particular facts (i.e., the 
double state taxation of dual residents’ estates on their deaths).99
Moreover, the political process analysis is more ambiguous 
in the dual resident context than it was in Wynne. That 
ambiguity provides a stronger rationale for the judicial protection 
of statutory residents since these double-taxed individuals do not 
vote in the second state assessing the resident-based income tax 
against them. As Justice Ginsburg observed in Wynne,100 the 
Wynnes sought tax relief from Maryland where they resided and 
voted.101 Double-taxed dual residents are deemed to reside in two 
states but can vote in only one of them. 
Much dual resident taxation is caused by “statutory residence” 
laws102 which classify individuals who spend time in a state without 
being domiciled there as residents for state income tax purposes. A 
dual state resident will typically vote in the state of her domicile, 
thus leaving her without the vote in the state of statutory residence 
which imposes a second, residence-based income tax upon her.103
Even if two states both claim to be an individual’s state of 
domicile, it is not likely that the individual can or should vote in 
both states. And when someone is a statutory resident of two 
states, he may vote in neither state because his state of domicile 
is a third state.  
In the typical dual resident/double taxation situation, an 
individual is domiciled in and can vote in only one of the two states 
taxing her. This is different than the case of the Wynnes—who 
voted in and were taxed by Maryland—since a double taxed dual 
resident lacks the ability to vote in at least one of the states taxing 
her as a resident. 
Voting of course is not the only form of political voice. A 
statutory resident can make political contributions in her state of 
statutory residence even if she cannot vote in that state because 
she is not domiciled there. Nevertheless, the political process 
concerns advanced by Justice Ginsburg in Wynne—the Wynnes 
were Maryland voters104—do not carry over to the double taxed 
dual resident who does not vote in her state of statutory 
99 See Cory, 457 U.S. at 86; Worcester Cty. Tr. Co., 302 U.S. at 294.  
100 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1813–15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
101 Id. at 1814–15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
102 Edward A. Zelinsky, Defining Residence for Income Tax Purposes: Domicile as 
Gap-Filler, Citizenship as Proxy and Gap-Filler, 38 MICH. J. INT’L L. 271, 274–75 (2017); 
Zelinsky, Apportioning, supra note 84, at 541–45. 
103 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-1-25(A) (2011) (stating that for voting purposes, “[a] 
person’s residence is his domicile”). 
104 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1814–15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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residence. Moreover, unlike the subject of internet sales taxation, 
which was a topic of substantial congressional debate,105 Congress 
has given virtually no attention to the problem of double taxed 
dual state residents. 
Considering the counterarguments, Wayfair and Wynne, on 
balance, indicate that those favoring the Court’s intervention to stop 
the double state income taxation of dual residents face an uphill 
fight. Long-standing precedents approve double taxation when two 
states both claim to be the taxpayer’s home state for tax 
purposes.106 In certain contexts, some Justices conclude that 
individuals with political remedies do not need the protection of the 
dormant Commerce Clause.107 Dual residents typically vote in the 
state of domicile, which is one of the states taxing them on their 
worldwide incomes. The Justices who are dormant Commerce 
Clause skeptics will not extend that doctrine to protect double-taxed 
dual residents. Consequently, those trying to convince the Court to 
stop such double taxation via the dormant Commerce Clause face a 
daunting challenge. 
B. Sourcing Nonresidents’ Incomes: The Case of Employer 
Convenience 
A second important dormant Commerce Clause issue for the 
future is the proper apportionment of individuals’ nonresident 
incomes for those who work in multiple states. Like the sales tax 
controversy in Wayfair, this issue involves the adaption of older legal 
doctrines to the imperatives of modern technology. Particularly 
salient in this context is New York’s so-called “convenience of the 
employer” test which has been used by the Empire State to tax 
nonresident telecommuters on the income they earn while working at 
their out-of-state homes.108
As Justice Ginsburg observed in her Wynne dissent, the 
states’ jurisdiction to tax individual incomes rests on the concepts 
of residence and source.109 A state of residence can exercise a 
form of in personam jurisdiction over an individual and, on that 
basis, can tax his entire worldwide income.110 In contrast, a 
state of source can tax a nonresident’s income on an in rem
basis, that is, because the income arises within the state 
even though the nonresident/taxpayer does not live there. 
105 See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2087, 2102 (2018) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting); see also Zelinsky, supra note 12, at 1189, 1197–98. 
106 See Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 89 (1982). 
107 See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1813–17 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
108 See Zelinsky, supra note 7, at 1.  
109 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1813–17 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
110 Id. at 1814. 
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Source-based jurisdiction is limited to the income a nonresident 
earns within the taxing state. 
In Wynne, Maryland taxed all of the Wynnes’ income since 
the Wynnes were Maryland residents.111 Many other states also 
taxed the income the Wynnes earned within those states since 
those states were the geographic settings within which the 
Wynnes earned such income.112 In Wynne, there was no difficulty 
deciding which income was earned in which state of source. 
However, modern technology often makes the source of 
income a contested question. In particular, modern technology 
permits what is sometimes labeled “telecommuting,” in which an 
individual works from home for an employer located in another 
state.113 Nonresident states can be overly-aggressive in asserting 
their ability to tax income on the basis of alleged source-based 
jurisdiction. New York’s “convenience of the employer” doctrine is 
the paradigmatic instance of such overreaching.114
Consider a law professor who lives in Connecticut and 
teaches in New York.115 On some days, he commutes to New York 
where he teaches classes and meets with students and 
colleagues.116 On the other days of the week, he works at home 
doing research and scholarship as well as grading papers and 
exams. Modern technology facilities these work-at-home days, by 
giving the professor access to legal databases for his research and 
by allowing him to stay in touch with his students and colleagues 
through email or other electronic forms of communication. 
Connecticut taxes all of this professor’s income on the ground 
that he is a Connecticut resident.117 New York also taxes all of 
this nonresident professor’s income on the theory that the 
111 Id. at 1793.  
112 See id.
113 Andrea Loubier, Benefits of Telecommuting for the Future of Work, FORBES (July 
20, 2017, 11:58 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrealoubier/2017/07/20/benefits-of-
telecommuting-for-the-future-of-work/#7aecd0c516c6 [http://perma.cc/P5DB-5H4W]. 
114 Edward A. Zelinsky, Pass the Multi-State Worker Act Also, 80 ST. TAX NOTES 719, 
720 (2016); Morgan L. Holcomb, Tax My Ride: Taxing Commuters in our National 
Economy, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 885, 922 (2008). 
115 See In re Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 801 N.E.2d 840, 843–44 (N.Y. 
2003). On Zelinsky, telecommuting, and New York’s “convenience of the employer” 
rule, see WALTER HELLERSTEIN ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 399–401 (10th ed. 2014). 
116 See Zelinsky, 801 N.E.2d at 843–44. 
117 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-701(a)(8) (2018) (“‘Connecticut taxable income of a 
resident’ means the Connecticut adjusted gross income of a natural person . . . .”); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 12-701(a)(20) (2018) (“‘Connecticut adjusted gross income’ means adjusted 
gross income . . . .”). 
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professor’s days worked at home in Connecticut are not for the 
employer’s convenience but are for the professor’s lifestyle.118
Connecticut gives a credit against its income taxes for the 
New York taxes the professor pays with respect to the income 
allocable to the days he teaches in New York.119 However, 
Connecticut (like most other states) will not grant a credit for the 
taxes New York assesses on the days the professor works at 
home in Connecticut, researching, writing, and grading.120
The net result is double taxation of the portion of the 
professor’s income allocable to the days he works at home in 
Connecticut. New York taxes this nonresident income even though, 
on these days, the professor, a Connecticut resident, works at home 
and receives his public services from the Nutmeg State. Connecticut 
taxes all of the professor’s income, grants a credit for the New York 
taxes allocable to the professor’s days spent in New York, but grants 
no credit for the New York taxes attributable to the income earned 
on the professor’s days working at home in Connecticut.121
Central Greyhound Lines v. Mealey,122 critical to Justice 
Alito’s opinion in Wynne,123 indicates that under the dormant 
Commerce Clause New York cannot tax income earned outside 
its borders—such as the income the professor is paid for 
researching, writing, and grading while at home in Connecticut.124
A nonresident telecommuter working at his out-of-state home is 
analogous to the bus in Central Greyhound, not taxable by the 
Empire State while the bus traversed the roads of Pennsylvania 
and New Jersey.125
Given the rise of work patterns denoted as telecommuting, 
the Court should address the import of Central Greyhound and 
the dormant Commerce Clause concept of apportionment in a 
world of telecommuting. States should only tax nonresidents on 
income they earn within the state, not income residents earn 
when they work at their out-of-state homes. Critical to this 
conclusion is the dormant Commerce Clause concept the Court 
has called “external consistency,” i.e., that state tax policies 
118 See Zelinsky, 801 N.E.2d at 844–45, 848. 
119 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-704(a)(1) (2018). 
120 See Zelinsky, 801 N.E.2d at 849 (“[I]t is Connecticut’s refusal to provide a credit to 
its resident for all of the nonresident income tax that the taxpayer paid to New York that 
has created the threat of double taxation.”). 
121 Id. at 849. 
122 Cent. Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948). 
123 See generally Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015). 
124 See Cent. Greyhound, 334 U.S. at 660–63. 
125 See id. at 660–64. 
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must, in practice, apportion their tax bases to reflect accurately 
where income is earned.126
As a counterargument, Wynne could be read as requiring 
Connecticut, as the state of residence, to grant a credit for the 
New York taxes assessed on this professor’s work-at-home days. 
This, however, is the less persuasive reading of Wynne. Wynne
required Maryland, as the Wynnes’ state of residence, to avoid the 
implicit tariff of double taxation.127 In particular, Wynne held that 
Maryland’s county income “tax unconstitutionally discriminates 
against interstate commerce” because that tax failed to grant a 
credit for taxes imposed by other states on the income the Wynnes 
earned in those other states.128
However, Connecticut grants a credit to its residents for the 
income they earn in New York and other states.129 Connecticut 
(like most other states) does not grant credits for taxes imposed by 
other states on income earned in Connecticut.130 Thus, the double 
taxation under New York’s so-called “convenience of the employer” 
doctrine stems, not from the resident state’s refusal to grant a 
credit, but from the nonresident state’s refusal to properly 
apportion and only tax the income earned within its boundaries.  
Consequently, the Court’s concern about double taxation 
manifested in Wynne should lead to the application of Central 
Greyhound and the external consistency test to the world of 
telecommuting. States like New York should only tax nonresident 
individuals on the income they earn in New York, not the income 
such individuals earn working at their out-of-state homes. 
Political process concerns reinforce this conclusion. Like 
statutory residents, nonresidents do not vote in the states which 
tax them on a source basis. Aggressive practices, like New York’s 
convenience of the employer doctrine, export New York’s tax burdens 
onto nonvoting, nonresidents. This is an instance of political 
dysfunction, precisely the situation where the case for applying the 
dormant Commerce Clause is most compelling. 
VII. CONCLUSION
A comparison of Wayfair and Wynne indicates that the Court 
is unlikely to abandon the dormant Commerce Clause altogether. 
However, the Justices who would forsake the dormant Commerce 
126 Zelinsky, supra note 38, at 808–10 (discussing the future of external consistency 
after Wynne).
127 Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1792.  
128 Id. at 1797. 
129 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-704(a)(1) (2008). 
130 See In re Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 801 N.E.2d 840, 849 (N.Y. 2003). 
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Clause can exercise critical influence in specific cases as they did 
in Wayfair.131 While Wayfair overturned Quill, Wayfair indicates
that the Court is reluctant to overrule its dormant Commerce 
Clause cases.132 On the other hand, when neither the Court nor 
Congress has spoken on a particular issue, the Court will consider 
significant extensions of the dormant Commerce Clause as it did 
in Wynne.133
Wayfair and Wynne suggest that, despite the persuasive 
arguments against the double state taxation of dual residents’ 
incomes, the Court will be reluctant to overturn its long-standing 
precedents upholding the double state taxation of dual residents. 
The Court is more likely to extend dormant Commerce Clause 
protection when states are overly-aggressive in taxing the 
incomes of nonresidents such as New York’s “convenience of the 
employer” doctrine. 
131 See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2100 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring); 
id. at 2100–01 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).  
132 See id. at 2102 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
133 See Wynne, 135 S. Ct. at 1797. 
